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Abstract: This paper is an examination of the many points of intersection between 
Korean nationalism in both Koreas, and Chinese characters (Hanja), as well as a 
contextualization of the historical and, at times, antithetical relationship or binary 
consisting of Hanja and Han’gŭl (Chosŏn’gŭl). Emerging from liberation the two 
Korean states over the next several decades would “engage” Hanja with diverse and 
fluctuating positions and approaches at different times. These responses have ranged 
from the abolition of Hanja or the enforcement of Han’gŭl (Chosŏn’gŭl) exclusivity, 
to the re-establishment and strengthening of Hanja education. Koreans for over a 
century have responded to “issues of script” based on socially-created narratives. This 
phenomenon can be viewed through constructivist paradigms, or can be interpreted as 
implemented pragmatic policies exemplifying instrumentalist nationalism. This pa-
per’s assertion is that Korea’s vacillating response regarding Korean nationalism’s 
digraphic conflict is eloquent of the complex confluences that formed Korean ethnic 
nationalism, and therefore, Korean national identity. 
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영(影) 및 형(形)에 관하여: 한국(조선)민족주의의 
이중(二重)문자 갈등 
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개요: 본 논문은 남북한의 민족주의와 한자 사이의 많은 교차점을 분석하는 
것뿐만 아니라, 한자와 한글(조선글) 간의 역사적 때때로는 상반되는 관계 및 
이중성을 맥락화하는 것이다. 해방 후 수십 년 동안 남북한의 한자에 대한 
입장과 정책은 다양하게 변화해 왔고, 그것은 한자폐지 혹은 
한글(조선글)전용의 강제로 시작하여 한자교육의 재건이나 강화 등으로 
나타났다. 한 세기 이상에 걸쳐 한국(조선)인들은 “문자의 문제”에 대해 
사회적으로 이루어진 내러티브에 입각하여 반응했다. 이 현상은 구성주의 
패러다임을 통해 볼 수 있으며, 또는 도구적 민족주의를 증명하는 실용 정책의 
구현이라 해석될 수도 있다. 본 논문은 한국(조선) 민족주의의 이중(二重)문자 
갈등에 관한 변동적 반응이 한국(조선)의 민족주의 즉, 한국(조선)의 정체성을 
형성해 가는 복잡한 합류점임을 밝힌다. 
 
주요단어: 남북한의 민족주의,구성주의, 도구주의, 한자, 한글(조선글)전용 
 
 
W CIENIU I FORMIE: KONFLIKT DWUZNAKÓW 
W KOREAŃSKIM NACJONALIZMIE 
 
Abstrakt: Niniejszy artykuł stanowi wieloaspektowy przegląd „punktów stycznych” 
między koreańskim nacjonalizmem w obu Koreach a chińskimi znakami (Hanja). W 
tym aspekcie ukazuje również kontekstualizację historyczną, wystepujący niekiedy 
przeciwstawny wiązek czy istniejącą „podwójność”, która składa się z Hanja i 
Han’gŭl (Chosŏn’gŭl). W powstałych po wyzwoleniu dwóch państwach koreańskich 
w ciągu kolejnych kilku dekad znaki chińskie były nadal stosowane różnorodnie w 
różnym czasie. Zastanawiano się nad zniesieniem (likwidacją) Hanja i wprowadze-
niem wyłącznie pisma koreańskiego, jak i nad przywróceniem i umocnieniem eduka-
cji Hanja. Koreańczycy od ponad wieku odnoszą się do „kwestii pisma” w oparciu o 
społecznie tworzone narracje. Zjawisko to może być rozważane (analizowane) przez 
paradygmaty konstruktywistyczne lub może być postrzegane (tłumaczone) jako 
wprowadzenie pragmatycznych zasad ukazujących instrumentalny nacjonalizm. W 
kontekście koreańskiego nacjonalizmu pokazano konflikt dotyczący stosowania w 
Koreach dwuznaku (podwójności pisma: Hanja i Han’gŭl (Chosŏn’gŭl), co powiązane 
jest z kształtowaniem się koreańskiego nacjonalizmu etnicznego, a zatem i koreańskej 
tożsamości narodowej.  
 
Słowa kluczowe: Koreański nacjonalizm etniczny, konstruktywizm, instrumentalizm, 
znaki chińskie (Hanja), pismo koreańskie Han’gŭl (Chosŏn’gŭl) 
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1. Nation, National Identity and Nationalism 
A nation and its national identity, and therefore, its nationalism, are 
“historically contingent, context-driven, and defined and redefined in 
negotiation and transaction”. (Jenkins 1997: 143) Korean nationalism, 
essentially a form of ethnic nationalism, remains a key organizing 
principle of Korean society, both North and South. Korean national-
ism, depending on context, has been described as exhibiting the fol-
lowing characteristics: anti-imperialism, post-colonialism, anti-
communism, diaspora nationalism, and state nationalism. Shin Gi-
Wook rejects extreme notions of primordialism related to Korean eth-
nic nationalism, and has observed that the concept of a modern con-
struction of Korean nationalism is similar to that of other nations 
emerging during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Shin’s caveat, however, is that Korean nationalism was embedded in a 
particular social reality and history, the essence “without which, Ko-
rean nationalism cannot be conceptualized”. (Shin 2006: 8-10) 
In this paper, the author agrees with the premise that Korean 
nationalism is essentially ethnic and that this ascribes a shared identi-
ty. However, beyond that assumption the constructivist and instrumen-
talist approaches related to nationalism and political behavior overlap 
and can serve to refine inquiries into the policies and programs of both 
Koreas pertaining to issues related to scripts.  
Constructivism is a theory that political behavior of state ac-
tors can be understood as largely socially constructed. Scholarly ar-
guments are as follows: (1) cultural elements, mainly norms, shape the 
national interests and state policies; or both (2) cultural or institutional 
elements of states’ global or domestic environments, mainly norms, 
shape state identity; (3) variations in state identity, or changes in state 
identity, affect the national interests, policies of states, or both; (4) 
configurations of state identity affect interstate normative structures, 
such as regimes or institutions; and (5) state policies both reproduce 
and reconstruct cultural and institutional structure. (Jepperson et al. 
1996: 52-53) Alexander Wendt (1992: 398) writes that “identities are 
the basis of interests”, and “actors define their interests on the process 
of defining situations”. National identity defines “the group that the 
state is supposed to serve and protect”, and therefore, defining a na-
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tional identity is associated with national objectives that the state is 
expected to champion. (Horowitz et al. 2007: 3-4) This suggests that 
national identity provides a “cognitive framework for shaping its in-
terests, preferences, [and] worldview.” (S. S. Kim 2004: 41-42) 
Identity is the most fundamental concept that constructivists 
use, and is constituted in relation to difference. The process of acquir-
ing a specific identity is termed “identification”, and it proceeds at the 
same time with the process of differentiation. William Bloom (1993: 
51-52) describes identification as a mechanism for internalizing atti-
tudes, mores and behavior, which in turn, can evoke a shared group 
identification through meaningful and real experiences. Identification 
can be made only if the situation or environment is positive and bene-
ficial to an individual or a group. Popular support for any identifica-
tion comes only if the identification provides a meaningful interpreta-
tion of an experienced reality. 
Bloom’s observations are a logical transition in considering 
instrumentalism as it pertains to the topic of this paper. Instrumental-
ism, related to the actions of state actors, is defined as a group or na-
tion’s use of identity as a means of mobilization and as a tool of to 
achieve their interests. Inherent in this general description is an em-
phasis on analysis of material interests (economic, defense and securi-
ty), interests that ultimately correlate with political motivation and 
consequentialist ethical reasoning. Ernst B. Haas, while recognizing 
the socially constructed nature of modern nationalism, assumes “the 
dominance of instrumental motives among actors”, further elaborating 
that state actors “choose to act as nationalists for instrumental rea-
sons”. (Haas 1997: 34) Language is a cornerstone of identity in the 
context of modern nationalism. Eric Hobsbawm’s conclusion 
(Hobsbawm 1996: 1078) is that language has the potential for “politi-
cal self-assertion”. This seems to support the logic of a reverse-
engineered intuitive explanation that political self-assertion can enlist 
language in the achievement of political goals.  
2. Modern Korean Nationalism and the Politics of 
Language (prior to 1945)  
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It is essential to underscore the historical relationship between Hanja 
and Han’gŭl exclusivity (Han’gŭl chŏnyong) as it is referred to in the 
South, or Chosŏn’gŭl exclusivity (Chosŏn’gŭl chŏnyong), as is ex-
pressed in the North, at least within the parameters of this article. 
Modern Korean nationalism begins to form in the late nineteenth cen-
tury as a reaction against the foreign incursions into the country. The 
Tonghak Peasant’s Uprising of the 1890s, which precipitated the First 
Sino-Japanese War, was a conservative uprising against local scholar-
official abuses. There were, however, powerful anti-foreign elements 
in Tonghak rhetoric, stemming, in part, from the Japanese mercantile 
penetration of the Korean economy of the late nineteenth century. The 
Kabo Reforms (1984-1896) officially brought to an end the civil ser-
vice examination system predicated upon mastery of Hanja and classi-
cal Chinese texts. Han’gŭl was touted as the new official script. (Eck-
ert et al. 1990: 225) 
Michael E. Robinson has described the publication of The In-
dependent (1896-1899), and its use of Han’gŭl, as “a deliberate state-
ment of cultural unity and linguistic identity.” (Robinson 2007: 24) 
Chu Si-gyŏng, a language scholar and minister of education during the 
Empire of Korea period, first advocated the eradication of Chinese 
characters and the installment of Han’gŭl as the exclusive orthography 
for Korean daily newspapers in 1897. Chu and other Korean language 
purists based their promotion of a Han’gŭl-only policy on a belief in 
the superiority of the native Korean language and script over foreign 
languages and scripts (Janasiak 2012: 223; Park 1989: 118-119, cited 
in Lovmo 1999) the rhetoric of which is still occasionally used in both 
Koreas. Chu wrote that ending the use of Hanja and perfecting the use 
of Han’gŭl was the principle means for “ending the habit of aristocrat-
ic cultural slavery to Chinese culture”. (Robinson 2007: 34) 
With Korea’s independence from Chinese political hegemony 
at the turn of the century, the Han’gŭl-only movement grew with the 
formation of modern Korean nationalism, constituting a linguistic 
nationalism (in the case of Korea, Han’gŭl or Chosŏn’gŭl national-
ism). (Song 1994: 206) By 1900, the use of classical Chinese as a 
written form of official communication was popularly seen as not 
being modern and a symptom of cultural dependence, reflected by the 
then growing use of the term sadaejuŭi (“serving the great”) (Robin-
son 1988: 34), referring to what had been Korea’s relationship with 
China. In 1907, Chu Si-gyŏng published “Essay on Korean Language 
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and Letters” in which he lamented the failure to widely use Han’gŭl to 
“transform the thoughts and broaden the knowledge of the entire pop-
ulation”. For Chu and many other Korean scholars in the early twenti-
eth century, the use of Han’gŭl was synonymous with creating a new 
and truer identity as a nation; a corollary was that Hanja was an obsta-
cle to the achievement of that identity. (Shin 2006: 37) 
The Japanese colonial period (1910-1945) was awash with at-
tempts to impose rigid political, social and cultural controls over the 
Korean population. After the widespread protests and social unrest of 
the March First Movement of 1919, the Japanese government institut-
ed a “cultural policy” (bunka seiji), which allowed for a reopening of 
the public sphere in colonial Korea. (Eckert et al. 1990: 278; Robinson 
2007: 66) In 1921, Korean language scholars formed the Korean Lan-
guage Research Society (Chosŏn’ŏ yŏn’guhoe, later the Korean Lan-
guage Society, or the Hangŭl hakhoe), which led the movement to 
purify the Korean language, including championing Han’gŭl exclusiv-
ity. The Korean language movement was a prominent nationalist pro-
ject that attempting to maintain Korean cultural identity in the face of 
colonial racism. The movement prospered during the 1920s and 1930s 
and was associated with linguistic and literary research and publica-
tions, as well as mass literacy movements (in Han’gŭl) supported by 
the Japanese colonial administration to increase the literacy of the 
Korean population (Robinson 2007: 65-67) until 1934. 
After the implementation of the cultural assimilation policies 
of Japan in the mid-1930s, which attempted to extirpate Koreans of 
their national identity, the activities of the Korean language movement 
continued, despite the allegedly “provocative” nature of their work, 
such as the publication of Han’gŭl materials. Numerous members of 
the Korean Language Research Society were jailed in 1942, where 
many of them died. (King 2007: 209-210; Song 2001: 132; Robinson 
2007: 67) At one trial, Korean language scholars were charged with 
the crime of “working to ensure the future independence of Korea by 
reviving the national spirit (kukhon) and fostering national strength 
through a cultural movement”. (H. S. Lee 1973: 41, cited in Robinson 
2007: 68) According to Mark Peattie, one of the central assumptions 
of Japanese racism and assimilation pertaining to the Korean colony 
was the “same script, same race” (dōbun dōshu) paradigm that heark-
ened back to late nineteenth century Pan-Asian ideology of racial and 
cultural affinities of nations in the Sino-centric sphere juxtaposed 
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against Western nations. (Peattie 1984, cited in Shin 2006: 42) The 
assimilation policies of the Japanese occupiers promoted Korean na-
tionalism to be characterized by a distinctively Korean-centered view 
of East Asia. (Shin 2006: 42) 
Shin Gi-Wook (2006: 116-119) has described the emergence 
of modern Korean nationalism as consisting of two periods with dif-
ferent narratives. Shin argues that in the period of the 1890s to the 
years prior to the start of Japanese occupation in 1910, Korean nation-
alism was predicated upon the universalist values of modernization, in 
national response to the collapse of the Sino-centric world and the 
increasing influence of foreign powers; in the second period, emerging 
toward the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, Korean 
nationalist’s central narrative was dominated by particularism in the 
form of ethnicization of Korean nationalism as Japan strengthened its 
domination of Korea. (Shin 2006: 39-40; Haarmann 1993: 154-157) 
The foundational components of modern Korean nationalism 
are relevant to the formation of narratives concerning an often opposi-
tional relationship between Hanja and Han’gŭl: Han’gŭl was symbolic 
of both modernity and/or the essence of “true” Korean identity, 
whereas Hanja became associated with the contradictions of pre-
modern Korea: political incapacity and foreign domination by China, 
and a rich heritage of scholarly brilliance. The historical Hanja-
Han’gŭl binary came to be defined along divides within Korean iden-
tity itself, and has continued to recapitulate for over a century. 
3. Script Binary in the Two Koreas 
3.1 North Korea  
The character of the five years after liberation in the northern part of 
the Korean peninsula has been described by Charles K. Armstrong as 
“revolutionary”. (Armstrong 2003: 241) Contributing to the profound 
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transformation in the North was the political orientation and ap-
proaches of the Soviet Union’s occupation of Korean north of the 
thirty-eighth parallel. The Soviet communist’s ideological predisposi-
tion to conceptualize the desires of post-colonial peoples for revolu-
tion made their administration seemingly more attuned to the aspira-
tions of the Korean people. The Soviet occupation forces expeditious-
ly saw to the surrender of Japanese forces and the expulsion of Japa-
nese persons from the North to Japan. The emphasis on economic and 
social justice for the masses, albeit totalitarian, was generally support-
ed, except for targeted groups, such as large landowners, wealthy 
merchants, Christians, and those Koreans who had “collaborated” with 
the Japanese occupation government. (Weathersby 1993: 16) 
The Soviet Civil Administration (Grazhidanskia Admin-
istratsiia) recognized the legitimacy of the popular “people’s commit-
tees” which had come into existence in the late summer of 1945, using 
these organizations as a means of refining political control. (Eckert et 
al. 1990: 330-331; Weathersby 1993: 5) The rapid and thorough im-
plementation of Soviet-supervised land reform in 1946, in which lands 
of what had been seen as exploitive large landowners were redistribut-
ed to former tenant farmers was a fulfillment of long-held desire for 
social and economic reform. The reaction of most Koreans in the 
North to this program was a sense of “post-colonial” rectification, and 
highlighted the convergence of Korean aspirations and the politics of 
liberation and revolution espoused by Soviet forces who occupied the 
North until 1948. (Armstrong 2003: 38-47; Cumings 1981: 384-396) 
One advantage of the Soviet occupation forces was the num-
ber of Korean interpreters. According to Andrei N. Lankov, by early 
1946, there were some 140-150 Soviet Koreans in Soviet occupied 
Korea. (Lankov 2002: 118) Other figures for actual Korean-speaking 
Soviet Koreans range from an estimate of approximately 300 (Suh 
1967: 317, cited in Cumings 1981: 554), to “thousands” of interpreters 
virtually all of whom were from a long-established Korean-Soviet 
population. This language connectivity with the population was better 
enabled the Soviet Union’s rapid rendering of assistance in a variety 
of projects designed to enhance Korean economic and technical re-
covery, projects often utilizing Soviet Korean civilians. (Scalapino 
and Lee 1972: 318 and 383) 
The issue of illiteracy was of concern for both emerging cen-
ters of political power in a divided Korea. Two Japanese surveys of 
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Korean literacy among the adult population during the Japanese occu-
pation period, conducted in 1930 and 1944, indicated the literacy rate 
in Korea to be no higher than approximately 23 percent. In 1945, at 
the time of liberation, only 35 percent of school-age children were 
attending primary and secondary schools in newly liberated Korea, 
this out of a population of 21 million; an additional 3.5 to 4 million 
Koreans were living in the Korean diaspora by the end of the war. 
(Caprio and Jia 2009) One-fourth of the population in North Korea, an 
estimated 2,300,000 people, were counted by the new government as 
illiterate (Song 2015: 482-483), though some statistics put the number 
as high as 2,500,000. (Popov 1958: 194, cited in King 2007: 210-211)  
“Eradication of Illiteracy” programs were instituted during 
and after the formation of the North Korean state under the leadership 
of Kim Il Sung. As part of these programs Chinese characters were 
identified as impediments in quickly achieving literacy, as the native 
phonetic alphabet was infinitely easier to master. (Kumatani 1990: 90) 
The impetus in the North was greatly hastened by the efforts of a Ko-
rean communist who had been living in China, Kim Tu-bong. Kim, 
who returned to Korea in 1946 and who was a noted linguist and dis-
ciple of Chu Si-gyŏng, pressed the emerging North Korean leadership 
to implement Chosŏn’gŭl exclusivity. (C. G. Kim 2006: 36) By Sep-
tember 1946, there were some 10,000 schools of national writing 
(Chosŏn’gŭl) operating in the North. During the winter of 1947/1948, 
an estimated 951,320 people learned to read and write Korean. (Popov 
1958: 195, cited in King 2007: 211) 
The elimination of Hanja was consistent with communist ide-
ology, since Chinese orthography was considered as “property of only 
a few, [and as]...feudalistic”. (C. W. Kim 1978: 167, cited in Lovmo 
1999; Song 2015: 483) For North Korea, the elimination of illiteracy 
(and Chinese characters) was “an essential prerequisite to enable the 
party and the government to spread their policies among the people”. 
(Kumatani 1990: 91) In 1947, newspapers began printing without the 
use of Hanja; by 1949, Kim Il Sung had ordered the total eradication 
of Hanja, making temporary exceptions only in the case of classical 
references, scientific and proper names, and then only in parentheses. 
(Kumatani 1990: 91-92) The government evidently understood the 
necessity to augment people’s understanding of the meaning these 
Sino-Korean words through the temporary use of Chinese orthogra-
phy. The efforts to eliminate Hanja during this period is thought to 
William STRNAD: On Shadow and Form … 
96 
have encouraged the study of Chosŏn’gŭl, which in turn helped the 
North achieve a literacy rate for virtually all adults by the end of 1948. 
(C. W. Kim 1978: 166, cited in King 2007: 211) North Koreans who 
were opposed to the full abandonment of Hanja (because of the result-
ing confusion in the vocabulary system) were dealt with by being pub-
licly denounced as “the remains of the overthrown exploiting class, 
sectarian factors deeply influenced by flunkeyism, doctrinism, and 
reactionaryism”. (Lovmo 1999) 
The political climate in North Korea following the signing of 
the armistice in July 1953 is relevant to the official encouragement of 
Chosŏngŭl exclusivity. In post-Korean War North Korea, with the on-
going process of collectivization, the membership in the Korean 
Worker’s Party expanded greatly, from 750,000 at the end of hostili-
ties in 1953 to 1,164,945 by 1 January 1956. Collectivization of agri-
culture implied a reorganization of the local bases of political power. 
By April 1956, 56.8 percent of party members were from the poor 
peasant class. (J. W. Kim 1975: 184) A recognized need for literacy 
skills beyond the basics to mass indoctrination and mobilization was 
behind the program. The majority of new party members were from 
the poor peasantry, which suggested lower levels of education and 
higher rates of marginal literacy. Politically, the official elimination of 
Hanja in North Korea was sensible given the need of Kim Il Sung to 
solidify his political power base among the new political cadre. 
The symbol of the Korean Worker’s Party displays the socie-
tal elements of the Korean socialist state and is suggestive of an irony 
in post-Korean was North Korean that merits mentioning. Contained 
in the symbol are: the sickle (agriculture, farmers (nongbu)), the 
hammer (industry, laborers (kŭlloja)), intersected by a vertical brush 
(civil service, technocrats (samuwŏn)), while the party cadre (kanbu), 
are implied by the symbol in its entirety. A legacy of Korean history 
was the traditional desire of Koreans, both North and South, to hold 
office. This terminal value had been perpetuated by the civil service 
exam (kwagŏ) system, based on mastery of Chinese characters and 
classical Chinese learning. After 1953, farmers increasingly left the 
agricultural sector to become technocrats, and by 1958, with the party 
ranks swollen to 12 percent of the adult population, the technocrats 
were estimated to be as much as 20 percent of the adult population. 
During the commencement of the Chŏllima Movement, as much as 50 
percent of the technocrats were transferred to the industrial and agri-
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cultural sectors to alleviate widespread labor shortages. (J. W. Kim 
1975: 195-196; Szalontai 2005: 118-122)  
Until 1948, North Korea had used mixed script in its official 
texts including its party newspaper, the Rodong Sinmun. That year, 
Kim Il Sung ordered the Workers’ Party to stop using mixed script 
(Kukhanmunjongyong) and start using Han’gŭl exclusively. Although 
Hanja had been abolished from official texts, North Korea continued 
to have Hanja education in the years following the signing of the ar-
mistice in 1953. During this time, elementary and middle school stu-
dents were supposed to be taught 600 characters and high school stu-
dents were to be taught additionally 1,200 characters, with an ultimate 
goal of 2,400 characters for university students. (M. S. Kim 1999) 
Even after 1956, when the People’s Republic of China adopted simpli-
fied Chinese characters (kanch’eja), North Korean schools continued 
to teach traditional Chinese characters (chŏngja), as it has done until 
to the present. (Kuiwon 2014) 
The transnational rhetoric of communism has been described 
as having been used by Korean revolutionaries as a means of achiev-
ing national objectives: liberation and independence. Korean com-
munists were strongly nationalistic. Kim Il Sung’s nationalist rhetoric 
reflected this tendency, and included concepts of restoring the “purity 
and unity” of the Korean people. Anti-colonialism and anti-
imperialism were the foundations of the establishment of the North 
Korean nation-state. (Shin 2006: 152-156) Kim Il Sung’s own evolv-
ing position on Chosŏn’gŭl exclusivity versus maintaining Hanja in 
the national educational curriculum demonstrates the conflict inherent 
in the Korean script binary as it relates to Korean nationalism.  
Despite the official pronouncements of Chosŏn’gŭl exclusivi-
ty from the founding of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea in 
1948, the North Korean regime exhibited continued desire to instruct 
Hanja as exhibited by the 1959 publication of the Chinese Character 
Textbook (Hanmun kyogwasŏ), which was designed to instruct eighth 
to tenth grade students on Sino-Korean terms in mixed script. (Hannas 
1997: 67) Kim Il Sung wanted to maintain cultural links with overseas 
Koreans and because it was needed to have mastery of Cultured Lan-
guage. (King 2007: 213) It seems reasonable, that these cultural links 
were in no small measure related to the Korean residents of Japan 
(Zainichi) which was a source of financial support and legitimacy in 
the legitimacy war between the two Koreas, particularly through the 
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pro-North General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (Chōsen 
Sōren). (Shipper 2010: 59-60)  
Of historical importance to Hanja use and education in the 
North are the two “conversations (kyosi) with linguists” conducted by 
Kim Il Sung in 1964 and 1966. In the 1964 conversation, Kim noted 
that the presence of Hanja in South Korean newspapers and books 
suggested that North Korea, in order to be aware of developments in 
the South, should strengthen the teaching of Hanja (M. S. Kim 1999) 
for the purposes of achieving unification. (C. J. Kim 2006: 37) Kim Il 
Sung had concluded that with Chosŏn’gŭl exclusivity being the new 
policy, there were clear indications that Hanja education was often 
neglected. In the same 1964 conversation, Kim announced his inten-
tion to reintroduce Hanja education, lamenting that university gradu-
ates in North Korea had a difficult time with Korean language because 
of their lack of Hanja knowledge. (Hatori 1991: 270, cited in King 
2007: 213-214) 
In 1966, Kim Il Sung ordered that Hanja instruction be reinsti-
tuted as part of the curriculum in North Korean secondary education. 
In 1968, the government in P’yŏngyang established a required stand-
ard of 2,000 characters to be taught from the first year of North Kore-
an junior school (grade five) through advanced middle school. (C. J. 
Kim 2006: 37) The curriculum was termed “foreign orthography”. 
(Hannas 1997: 68; M. S. Kim 1999; J. K. Kim 2006) By 1969, the 
2,000 characters mandated for instruction throughout the six years of 
advanced middle school were to receive two hours of instruction per 
week. (King 2007: 214) The Hanja instruction was distributed as fol-
lows: 1,500 for grades five through eight, and another 500 characters 
for grades nine and ten. In 1970, at which time Kim Il Sung observed 
that the students’ achievement in Hanja was “weak”, university stu-
dents were supposed to learn an additional 1,000 characters, coming to 
a total of 3,000 characters. (Yi 1989: 372, cited in Hannas 1997: 68-
69; M. S. Kim 1999) Teachers were supposed to instruct students on 
how to write Chinese characters, identification of constituent character 
radicals, and practice the use of technical Sino-Korean vocabulary in 
the classroom. (Kuiwon 2014)  
In addition to the observation that Hanja learning was relevant 
for North Koreans to keep informed about South Korea, Kim Il Sung’s 
thinking was directly related to his plans to reunify the peninsula 
through revolution in the South. (King 2007: 214) After his pro-
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nouncement of the “Equal Emphasis Policy” in 1962, North Korea 
had launched a military buildup dedicating as much as 30 percent of 
its total budget to defense. Beyond the thinking related to political ties 
with China, Kim Il Sung increased the number and frequency of mili-
tary provocations between 1967-1969, in what some historians have 
called “The Second Korean War”. (Bolger 1991: 1-5) Kim’s strategy 
was, in part, driven by the presence of widespread poverty in the 
South, political opposition to Park Chung Hee, and the United States 
increasing involvement and buildup in Vietnam. On a personal level, 
Kim Il Sung surely remembered his advantage as a young partisan 
having had a middle school education, which he had obtained while 
his family lived in Manchuria. (Lankov 2002: 51) Relative to the 
standards of the 1930s and 1940s, Kim Il Sung was an educated per-
son and knowledge of Hanja was useful in his rise to power, at least 
among Korean partisans, many of whom were illiterate. (Suh 1988: 6) 
Most available materials strongly indicate that Kim believed that the 
North could successfully engineer a revolution in the South; the North 
Korean population would be at an educational disadvantage compared 
to the larger Southern population who had a better grasp of Hanja. 
(Szalontai 2005: 18)  
In 1971, a new Hanmun textbook for use in North Korean 
university history departments was disseminated. The work contained 
3,323 Hanja largely based on lexicon drawn from Kim Il Sung’s Se-
lected Works and the overwhelmingly political language of other 
communist publications. In March 1972, a “Mixed Script Reader” 
(Kuk-Hanmun tokbon) was published. Yi Yun-p’yo has speculated 
that the lexicon selected for the 1972 reader was based upon applica-
bility to high-level Korean used in modern contexts. (Yi 1989: 372, 
cited in Hannas 1997: 68) In the preface of the reader, Kim Il Sung 
relates the mastery of Hanja to address potential problems with com-
munication with South Koreans when the ultimate goal of national 
unification was achieved. (Song 2015: 485) 
Amid these developments related to Hanja, North Korea from 
the 1960s through much of the 1980s was conducting language re-
form. The language reform policy of the Democratic People’s Repub-
lic of Korea (North Korea) was based on communist ideology. This 
resulted in a removal of Sino-Korean terminologies, and a gradual 
simplification of speech levels, making North Korean speech appear 
more “egalitarian” than South Korean speech. (Yeon 2007: 151 and 
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154) North Korea called their standard speech “Cultured Language” 
(Munhwaŏ), largely based on P’yŏngyang speech, and to a lesser de-
gree, the idiolect of Kim Il Sung. (Kumatani 1990: 105-106) In the 
process of language reform, the North replaced many Japanese loan-
words and Sino-Korean terms with newly coined native words. The 
North Korean government was able to solve the “homophone prob-
lem” that exists in Sino-Korean terms by simply deleting certain 
words with similar sounds from their lexicon. (Lee and Ramsey 2000: 
309-310) 
Kim Jong Il was named the successor to his father at the Sixth 
Party Congress in October of 1980. Thereafter, the younger Kim be-
gan to play an increasing role in issuing guidance and directing activi-
ties in the North. Throughout the 1980s, Kim Jong Il, while serving as 
the chief of the powerful North Korean National Defense Committee, 
often rendered guidance on the need to strengthen Hanja education in 
the North. (J. K. Kim 2006) After the death of Kim Il Sung in 1994, 
Kim Jong Il continued his father’s directives regarding the importance 
of Hanja to North Korean education, this despite the fact that Hanja 
use was declining in South Korea. In a Hanja textbook published in 
during his years as leader, Kim Jong Il particularly noted that the pre-
ponderance of Korean scientific jargon was Sino-Korean. There had 
been some concerted efforts in the 1960s to “purify” scientific jargon 
particularly in the medical field that were heightened in the 1970s, but 
these efforts failed and North Korean scientists returned to using Sino-
Korean by the late 1980s. Kim Jong Il stated the following: 
 
“To further develop our country’s sciences and language, to achieve inde-
pendent reunification of our fatherland, and to completely resolve our na-
tion’s problems, we must still learn Hanja”. (Kim Jong Il quoted in Kuiwon 
2014) 
 
There are numerous other quotes and comments attributed to 
Kim Jong Il related to Hanja education. In April 1994, with the publi-
cation of the text Cultured Language Learning (Munhwaŏ haksŭp), 
Kim Jong Il pointed out that students must learn Hanja in order to 
properly speak the very “life of the Korean language”. (J. K. Kim 
2006) On 11 August 2000, while in Beijing, Kim Jong Il was reported 
to have criticized the prevalence of an “obstinate moral obligation” to 
Chosŏn’gŭl exclusivity. Lastly, on 18 June 2005, Kim emphasized 
that knowledge of Hanja was necessary so that the language of the two 
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Koreas would not become “differentiated” (ijilhwa) from each other. 
(J. K. Kim 2006) 
3.2 South Korea 
The liberation of Korea and the subsequent occupation by American 
forces in the South brought expectations of change among Koreans. In 
the sector south of the thirty-eighth parallel, the trajectory of the 
American occupation provided a substantially different one compared 
to the Soviet occupation in the North. The Americans committed two 
serious errors. The first was an attempt to retain members of the hated 
former colonial administration until stability was established. This 
decision was reversed after strong public protest. Second, the Ameri-
can occupation forces immediately rejected the legitimacy of the peo-
ple’s committees which spontaneously emerged in August and Sep-
tember 1945 throughout Korea, conceiving of such organizations as 
being fronts for “leftist/communist” agitation. (Cumings 1981: 137-
142 and 267-268; Gills 1996: 34-37) The traditional American under-
standing of liberation and nation-building was not emphatically revo-
lutionary, but rather, more about consensus building and institutional 
or procedural foundations for “democracy”. The Americans were in-
decisive, blinded by their own projection of American democratic 
aspirations onto the Korean social setting, and usually failed to appro-
priately interpret the political dynamics of post-liberation Korea, 
which included demands for economic and social justice. (Henderson 
1968: 113-136) United States forces, unlike their Soviet counterparts 
in the North, conceptualized the trusteeship as a means of forging 
institutional frameworks for establishing a left-right coalition govern-
ment that would form the basis of a new state. (Taylor and Taylor 
1995: 254; B. B. C. Oh 2002: 4-5; Kang 2005: 179-181)  
The Americans have been criticized for dependence on Eng-
lish-language Korean interpreters, most of whom were well-educated 
and from the landed-interests of the yangban, or Koreans who had 
worked for, or in cooperation with the Japanese occupation govern-
ment. The slow pace of land reform was an example of the vested 
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interests stonewalling popular sentiment; land reform was not passed 
until 22 June 1949, only after much pressure from the Americans; the 
much awaited land was incrementally implemented throughout the 
decade of the 1950s. (Nahm 1996: 382) The emerging administration 
of Syngman Rhee in the Republic of Korea (1948-1960) depended on 
support of a police force composed of Koreans who had worked for 
the Japanese police force. Additionally, the media and the education 
system in the South, dominated by Japanese-era journalists, continued 
language use practices established during the Japanese occupation 
period, which meant the continued use of Hanja. This was consistent 
with the generally conservative character of the centers of power of 
South Korea. (B. B. C. Oh 2002: 5)  
In the years of the American occupation of the South (1945-
1948), the literacy rate in Korea was fairly low, with estimates ranging 
between 20-40 percent. Commencing in 1945, the Korean Language 
Society (Han’gŭl hakhoe) actively advocated Han’gŭl exclusivity and 
the eradication of all Hanja from Korean writing. In November 1945, 
the Korean Education Council (Chosŏn kyoyuk simŭijhoe) (Hannas 
1997: 69) moved to examine the issue of Hanja in education. On 8 
December 1945, the council voted to eliminate Hanja from elementary 
and middle schools textbooks. An American official working for the 
Department of Education under control of the United States Army 
Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) named Paul S. Anderson, 
wrote in 1948 of the difficulty posed by Chinese characters in the 
South; Anderson observed that Hanja prevented “mass literacy so 
essential in a modern nation” and that as long as it was essential to 
read Hanja literacy would “remain the possession of the educated 
elite”. (Anderson 1948: 508-510, cited in King 2007: 215) While there 
were certainly forces in the South favoring the curtailment or outright 
abolition of Hanja, a number of factors conspired against them. First 
and foremost among these was the simple fact that, unlike in the 
North, where any and all individuals with former ties to local elites 
and the Japanese colonial administration were purged, and the United 
States military occupation officials in the South ended up leaving 
largely intact the members Japanese-educated elite and officialdom, 
all of whom were well-versed in Hanja. (King 2007: 215) 
In June 1948 the Ministry of Education launched a “Reclaim 
Our Language” movement, and the Korean Language Society submit-
ted a proposal. Han’gŭl-only usage was initially passed by the Nation-
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al Assembly on 30 September 1948, but was amended the next day 
under pressure from conservative, pro-Hanja elements to include the 
following caveat: “For the time being, however, Hanja may be used 
together with Han’gŭl”. On 9 October 1948, South Korea enacted, 
“The Law Concerning Hangul Exclusivity” (Han’gŭl chŏnyong-e 
kwanhan pŏmnyul), also known as Law Number 6. (Hannas 1997: 69) 
The law stated, “Public documents of the Republic of Korea shall be 
in Han’gŭl; however, when necessary, mixed script can be used”. 
(Han’gŭl chŏnyong-e kwanhan pŏmnyul chejŏng, 1948) The passing 
of the Han’gŭl Exclusivity Law was done in a post-independence pe-
riod filled with nationalist fervor, without protracted debate. Some 
scholars have speculated that this was the beginning of the incon-
sistent South Korean policy variations concerning Hanja throughout 
the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. (King 2007: 215-216) 
In 1951, the Ministry of Education published an official list of 
1,260 characters for common use and recognition, of which 1,000 
were to be learned in elementary and middle school. (King 2007: 216) 
By the end of 1953, however, South Korean law stipulated that stu-
dents through the end of junior high school (grade eight), were to be 
taught 1,787 Hanja. (M. S. Kim 1999) Indeed, the government made 
attempts at officially proclaiming “Han’gŭl exclusivity” in 1954 and 
1956, but with little or no success; the opposition within the govern-
ment was unwilling to implement a Han’gŭl exclusivity program. 
(Sohn 1991: 196) However, the first “abolish illiteracy” (munmaeng 
t’oech’i) campaign targeting adults was launched by the Ministries of 
Education, Interior, and Defense from 18 March to 31 May 1954, 
reducing adult illiteracy from 27.7 percent to 7.9 percent of the popu-
lation. Basic literacy was defined as basic mastery of Han’gŭl, and the 
campaigns continued to be conducted every spring for the remainder 
of the decade. (Seth 2002: 92)  
The Korean Language Society, after a decade of attacking the 
use of Hanja and advocating Han’gŭl exclusivity, finally convinced 
the government to approve new guidelines of a Revised Han’gǔl Plan. 
The Council of Ministers, under pressure from Han’gŭl exclusivity 
proponents, decided to ban the use of characters, and beginning in 
August 1957, police were reportedly even given orders to remove any 
signs from businesses written in “foreign scripts”, not just those in 
“Hanja”, as well as attempting to extend the ban related to public no-
tices and selected government documents. The media and educated 
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Koreans, however, protested the plan as removing an important link to 
Korea’s cultural heritage and the East Asian cultural context. (Song 
2005: 166; Hannas 1997: 70; King 2007: 216) The law became fully 
implemented in January of 1958, when guidelines were promulgated 
requiring that all public documents should be in Han’gŭl. Despite the 
ban there was a caveat that if the word was difficult its Hanja would 
be written in parenthesis after it. (Sohn 1991: 196; Han’gŭl chŏnyong 
silch’ŏn’yogang sihaeng 1958) 
Syngman Rhee frequently used instrumentalist nationalism, 
couched in anti-Japanese and anti-communist references, for the pur-
pose of state and regime survival in the face of Communist threats 
both internal and external, and later to enforce notions of legitimacy, 
before, during and after the Korean War. The reversal of the Syngman 
Rhee administration regarding Han’gŭl exclusivity was a very politi-
cal decision. The government likely saw the program helpful in bol-
stering its standing in a segment of the population, with little or no 
education, which still demanded social and economic justice (Y. P. 
Hong 1999: 151-152), particularly in light of the success of the 
Han’gŭl-only adult literacy campaigns.  
Ultimately, the specific domestic political reasoning for the 
reversal was related to the decreasing public support for the regime, 
exemplified by the relatively successful presidential candidacy of Cho 
Bong-am, a Moscow-educated, former communist and popular pro-
gressive received 30 percent of the popular vote in the 1956 election. 
The popularity of his mass-centered economic policies, and uncom-
promising nationalist line “no United States, no Soviet Union” (Y. J. 
Kim 2015: 70), won favor with a number of South Koreans. Moreo-
ver, the increasing support for the opposition Democratic Party, par-
ticularly in rural areas, which had been a dependable source of support 
for Rhee’s Liberal Party (Nahm 1996: 405; C. Y. Pak 1980: 149-150), 
was another motivation for garnering support among rural voters. 
In November 1957, the number of Hanja for daily use was of-
ficially expanded to 1,300. This had been designed to limit number of 
characters used in South Korean newspapers. The original 1957 guide-
lines for Han’gŭl exclusivity were not universally implemented, as 
many official documents from this time were still written in mixed 
script. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, it remained mandatory 
for South Korean public schools to teach students 1,000 Hanja starting 
from elementary school. Academics continued to recommend an in-
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crease in the number of characters taught. (Song 2015: 480; Kuiwon 
2013) Then in February 1963 the government decided to return to 
mixed script in school texts and manuals; this would be fully imple-
mented in 1965. The government decision was met with strong oppo-
sition, which included proposals to eliminate textbook Hanja in paren-
theses. In 1964, the Minister of Education published a list of 1,300 
Chinese characters for instructional purposes (Song 2005: 166), with 
600 to be taught in elementary schools, 400 in junior high schools, and 
300 in high schools. (Sohn 1999: 77; Hannas 1997: 70)  
The ascension of Park Chung Hee to power in the May Revo-
lution of 1961 brought about abrupt economic changes. Park launched 
a program of export-led economic development, which as of the early 
1960s, was a reflection of dependency theory. Dependency theory was 
an approach to economic development in contrast to modernization 
theory, originating in the plight of Latin American countries that were 
under “American exploitation”, and were thus in a state of perpetual 
dependency. Dependency theory recommended export-led economic 
strategies for peripheral national economies. (McCormack 2011: 192) 
The legitimization of the 1961 coup was to portray Korea’s past in an 
unfavorable light, suggesting an internal lack of political cohesion that 
invited foreign invasions, the loss of national identity, and the rise of 
flunkeyism as well as the lack of innovation in economic life and the 
resulting vicious circle of poverty and underdevelopment. (Moon and 
Jun 2011: 123) Park patterned his concept of economic nationalism 
based on prewar Imperial Japan’s desire to achieve a “rich country, 
strong defense” (Japanese, fukoku kyōhei, Korean, pu’kuk kang’wi), 
the state-developmental model which included a commitment to rapid 
economic development and establishing a strong national defense. (J. 
H. Kim 1978: 6) But Park Chung Hee also espoused the importance of 
national morality (kungmin toŭi) as a necessary component of national 
reconstruction, (Y. J. Kim 2011: 96) a concept which Park consistent-
ly injected into the logic of the May Revolution and many of his poli-
cy decisions while serving as president of South Korea. 
By 1966, however, Park began to realign his view of national-
ism, with a new found rhetoric emphasizing the legacy of Korean 
traditions, as in his 1966 state of the union speech:  
“In order to establish a firm national identity and to overcome social apathy, 
[South Korea] should reaffirm the superior legacies of [its] culture and tradi-
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tion and foster the creation of a new culture on the basis of these legacies”. 
(Park Chung Hee quoted in Moon and Jun 2011: 123) 
With this rediscovery of Korea’s traditional national identity, Park 
began large public works programs to preserve and restore cultural 
relics and historical sites, as well as glorify national myths, symbols 
and ritual through the glorification of national heroes, including Ad-
miral Yi Sun-sin (1545-1598) and King Sejong (1397-1450). Park 
launched a program of revival of the national spirit in 1968, an exam-
ple being the introduction of the pledge of national allegiance. The 
Park Chung Hee regime placed a new emphasis on the “glorious na-
tional history”, opening the Academy of Korean Studies, which liter-
ally means the “Institute of Korean Spiritual Culture”, with the mis-
sion of establishing and constructing historical sites, museums and 
monuments to famous historical figures throughout the nation. The 
1968 “Charter for National Education” (Kungmin kyoyuk hŏnjang) 
established a curriculum for primary and secondary schools rich in 
support for Park’s economic nationalism. The phrase “We are born 
with the historical mission of restoring our nation”, was to be memori-
alized by all students. The Charter made the subject of “national histo-
ry” an obligatory subject in all universities. (Moon and Jun 2011: 123-
124) Park’s political strategy was to strengthen his support among 
conservative voters by appealing to what were universally held no-
tions of the Korean nation. 
Characteristic of Park’s adaptable nationalism were his early 
criticism of Confucianism and his attempt to establish Han’gŭl exclu-
sivity. During Park Chung Hee’s 1963 presidential campaign, the can-
didate criticized a famous Korean Confucian scholar from North 
Kyŏngsang Province, Park’s native province and a key source of polit-
ical support. The critique of Kim Sŏng-il was that he and other Confu-
cian scholars and officials had wasted national energy on “empty theo-
ry and futile debate” (kong’il kongron). Much of the conservative 
population responded negatively. During the 1970s, Park subsequently 
reversed himself, praising Confucian virtues of propriety and filial 
piety, and Korean Confucian scholars, to including affixing their im-
ages to Korean wŏn notes: Yulgok (Yi I) (1536-1584) on the 5,000 
wŏn note in 1972, and T’oegye (Yi Hwang) (1501-1570) on the 1,000 
wŏn note in 1976. (K. O. Kim 1996: 217-218; Moon and Jun, 2011: 
123-124) 
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Park Chung Hee’s attempt to establish Han’gŭl exclusivity in 
the 1960s and early 1970s, in addition to revealing changes in his own 
nationalist politics, demonstrated the potential for controversy along 
the intersecting fault lines between Korean nationalism and the Hanja-
Han’gŭl binary. In 1966, Park prepared a secret memorandum in 1966 
to commence a national program to gradually phase-out the use of 
Hanja in media and education. On 6 January 1968, the Korean Lan-
guage Society appealed to Park to implement an all-Han’gŭl program 
applicable to both private and public sectors. (Hannas 1997: 70) Park 
reasoned that Han’gŭl exclusivity was suggestive of “modernity” and 
seemed to be consistent with his drive toward economic moderniza-
tion. 
On 14 March 1968, Park Chung Hee issued the following in-
structions to the relevant ministries: the Ministry of Education was to 
reduce the number of characters taught from 1,300 to 700 by 1969. 
Afterward, by 1972, Hanja was to be totally eliminated from all text-
books. The Ministry of Public Information was to supervise and en-
force the reduction of the number of Hanja used in newspapers and 
other printed materials from 2,000 characters used as of 1968 to 1,300 
characters by 1969, 700 characters by 1970, and achieving Han’gŭl 
exclusivity by 1972 (Park Chung Hee chŏng’gwŏn-ŭi han’gŭl 
sich’aek yŏnp’yo 2005); the Ministry of Government Administration 
was to gradually overview the reduction of the number of Hanja used 
in public documents and business cards; and lastly, the Office of Court 
Administration was to gradually mark with Han’gul the family rec-
ords, registration, registration entries, and lawsuits. (M. S. Kim 1973: 
349-350, cited in Hannas 1997: 71; Kuiwon 2013) 
Park Chung Hee, on 25 October 1968, publicly revealed his 
Han’gŭl exclusivity initiative, appealing nationalist sentiments: 
“It has been over 520 years since King Sejong promulgated Han’gŭl. To not 
use Hangul exclusively and be reluctant is to be anti-independent, and not to 
have a modern way of thinking. It is behavior that drives many of our coun-
trymen, who do not know Hanja, away from our culture”. (Park Chung Hee 
quoted in Kuiwon 2013) 
The new policy, his “Five-Year Hangul Exclusivity Plan” (Han’gŭl 
chŏnyong o-kae-nyŏn kyehoek), also known as “Prime Minister’s In-
struction No. 68” was to be accomplished through legislative and ex-
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ecutive means. Adding to the momentum of implementation, a further 
change in policy away from Hanja occurred in 1968-1969 when a 
Committee for the Exclusive Usage of Han’gǔl was created by the 
President of South Korea and the Minister of National Defense an-
nounced that the Korean military would use only Han’gǔl in its writ-
ten materials. (King 2007: 216) Invoking the spirit of national inde-
pendence, the government also banned Hanja from all school manuals 
in 1969. (Kuiwon 2013) The deadline for total elimination of Hanja 
was later advanced to 1 January 1970, to preempt countermoves by 
opposition. Park Chung Hee emphasized it would be illegal to teach 
Hanja and use mixed script textbooks in public schools in all grades, 
from elementary school to high school. By 1970, most basic textbooks 
for South Korean students had been rewritten into an all-Han’gŭl 
form. The propaganda stating that Korea was entering the new 
“Han’gŭl Age” (Han’gŭl sedae) started proliferating throughout Ko-
rean society. (Hannas 1997: 70-71; Kuiwon 2013) 
The initiative sparked intense political debate. A poll by the 
Joongang Ilbo in 1970, revealed a deep division among South Kore-
ans, with only 54 percent of those surveyed in support of the plan. In 
addition, many academics, writers, and journalists voiced their opposi-
tion to the initiative. Some went as far as calling the Hangul Exclu-
sivity initiative unconstitutional. After public outcry, Park Chung Hee 
attempted to placate the opposition by stating that he personally found 
Hanja important to Korean culture and history. (Kuiwon 2013) 
In December 1971, the Park Chung Hee administration re-
versed its position, and ordered the teaching of Hanja in public 
schools. The impetus for the reversal appears to have been at least 
three considerations related to domestic politics. First, an open peti-
tion of 140 prominent citizens of diverse political persuasions ex-
pressed their opposition to an all-Han’gŭl program, and proposed a 
reintroduction of Hanja education. (Hannas 1997: 71) Second, Park’s 
political confidence was undoubtedly eroded from his narrow victory 
over Kim Dae Jung in the presidential election held on 27 April 1971. 
Park won with a margin of victory of only 946,928 votes. Third, Kim 
Dae Jung’s campaign rhetoric of “mass participatory economics” and 
scathing denunciations of the Park administration as corrupt fed into 
popular dissatisfaction with the government’s failure to address a 
broad range of social and economic issues stemming from rapid de-
velopment. Social unrest continued for the remainder of the year until 
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Park Chung Hee declared a state of national emergency on 6 Decem-
ber 1971. (H. A. Kim 2004: 124-126; Kang 2005: 206-207)  
In 1972, the government only permitted optional Hanja educa-
tion in middle schools and high schools. It still maintained the ban on 
Hanja education in elementary schools and the prohibition on mixed 
script in textbooks other than Hanja textbooks. While many middle 
and high schools in Korea did restore Hanja education, there were 
plenty that did not. The South Korean government in 1972 published a 
new list of 1,800 basic Hanja for secondary school education, and then 
officially reintroduced Hanja into South Korean school textbooks in 
1974. A politically sustainable stasis was struck in 1976 when the 
Ministry of Education agreed to keep Hanja education out of elemen-
tary schools and the 1,800 Hanja would be taught in special courses, 
rather that part of language and humanities instruction. (Hannas 1997: 
71-72) 
 Clarity of meaning and ease of use was a controversy regard-
ing the Han’gŭl exclusivity law, which as of 1970, provided for the 
eventual elimination of difficult Sino-Korean terms in government 
statutes. Supporters of Han’gŭl exclusivity argued that comprehensi-
bility would be enhanced if “opaque Sino-Korean words” were re-
placed by pure Korean terminologies. Park Chung Hee himself criti-
cized this argument, denouncing the wholesale conversion to pure 
Korean words as “too unrealistic”, and questioned the notion of using 
“overly contrived pure Korean coinages for perfectly natural, well-
established Sino-Korean words”. (Park 1989: 130 and 137, cited in 
Lovmo 1999) In August 1977, the Ministry of Education once again 
noted that because of ambiguity from Han’gŭl-only in high-level vo-
cabulary, publishers were required to use English language glossaries 
for such all-Han’gŭl terminologies. (Hannas 1997: 72-73) 
The result of Park Chung Hee’s attempt to establish Han’gŭl 
exclusivity was that Koreans who attended school during this time and 
a large percentage of the subsequent generations were never formally 
taught Hanja. In the following decades, the percentage of Hanja use in 
Korean writing plummeted. The authoritarian regime of Chun Doo 
Hwan maintained fragments of Park Chung Hee’s Han’gŭl exclusivity 
policy, such as discouraging the reading of Confucian classics viewing 
them as subversive anti-authoritarian material. A 1956 survey of 
South Korean adults revealed that a majority read a pure Han’gŭl text 
slower and with more difficulties than a mixed-script text. By 1977, 
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that had changed dramatically, with a reported 80 percent of surveyed 
adults able to read pure Han’gŭl text with greater facility than mixed-
script texts. (Taylor and Taylor 1983: 90; Kuiwon 2013) 
Over the last two decades, scholarly discourse has proliferated 
regarding two byproducts of globalization: integration and fragmenta-
tion. Global incursion into the national space of a nation, that is, a 
bounded community, is asserted be accompanied by a rise in national-
ism. (Sabanadze 2010) Anthony D. Smith observed that globalization, 
as with modernization, inevitably produces social and cultural disrup-
tion, and nation-states often react to upheaval by promoting ethnic and 
national solidarity. (Smith 1995, cited in Shin 2006: 214) In the case 
of South Korea, this was demonstrable in the paradigmatic changes 
related to globalization in the post-Cold War era (S. B. Kim et al. 
2002: 7-8), and in the “script nationalism” in both Koreas, in which 
Han’gŭl (Chosŏn’gŭl) have increasingly been esteemed as a symbol of 
national purity and a defense against foreign influences resulting from 
modernization and globalization. (King 2007: 232-233) 
Shin Gi-Wook has correlated globalization/modernization and 
the assertion of nationalism in the political behaviors of the admin-
istrations of Park Chung Hee, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Dae Jung. 
The relationship between Park’s attempt at Han’gŭl exclusivity and 
his nationalist shift in 1966 which included the resurrection of nation-
alist symbols and figures, and his drive to national economic moderni-
ty, according to Shin, parallels Kim Young Sam’s emphasis on the 
history of Korea’s democratic heritage by promoting Korean heritage 
and culture, while pursuing a globalization (segyehwa) strategy. (Shin 
2006: 214-216; J. K. C. Oh 1999: 135-136) In the 1990s, organiza-
tions such as the Research Institute for Education in the Korean Lan-
guage and Writing spearheaded a drive to restore mixed-script, as 
exemplified by such books as Research on the Orthography of the 
National Language. (Taylor and Taylor, 2014: 177) Books the In 
1993, for the first time in 30 years all public schools in all grades in 
South Korea were allowed to teach Hanja. (Kuiwon 2013) Interest in 
Hanja among South Koreans in the 1990s expanded because of the 
potential for economic opportunities with China and Japan. (S. H. 
Park 1994: 34); however, Taylor and Taylor (2014: 177) suggest that 
the trend, was in part, prompted by complaints of older readers to 
restore the use of Hanja in daily South Korean newspapers.  
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Kim Dae Jung pursued reinvigoration of Hanja more than all 
post-authoritarian presidents, and made many attempts at reversing 
Han’gŭl exclusivity policies. In 1999, one year after his election, he 
announced his intentions to reintroduce Hanja in public documents 
and in education. This was met with great resistance. (Song 2005: 
167) The government’s announcement of plans to reintroduce Hanja-
Han’gŭl parallel use was immediately the object of widespread pro-
tests by the forces of the proponents of Hangul exclusivity. (J. H. Lee 
1999) Typically, the criticisms included concerns over the academic 
burden on students at the cost of other subjects, and called the reintro-
duction of Hanja was an “affront to national sovereignty” and a “re-
gressive” act. During the Kim Dae Jung presidency, Hanja in a small-
er font size was placed below Han’gŭl, on road signs, bus stops, and 
on subway signs. In education, Classical Chinese was re-introduced as 
a one year elective in public high schools in 1999 and Hanja Profi-
ciency Test (Hanja’nŭngnyŏkgŏmsasihŏm) results above a certain 
ranking were admitted as a publicly recognized qualification (Kuk-
ka’gong’injagyŏk) in 2001. (Song 2005: 167; Kuiwon 2013) 
4. Conclusion  
The staying power of the bifurcated narrative related to Hanja and 
Han’gŭl (Chosŏn’gŭl), still prominent in both Koreas, remains strong. 
In North Korea, despite Chosŏn’gŭl exclusivity in the media and the 
extolling of the script as being a superior writing script, early in the 
reign of the new North Korean leader, Kim Jong Un, the North Kore-
an government reported that the new leader had composed a Classical 
Chinese poem at the age of three. The importance of Hanja was reiter-
ated in a North Korean Hanja textbook published in 2013, in which 
Kim Jong Un explains to students that Hanja education is not only 
necessary to improve Korean language vocabulary, or to be used in 
trade with neighboring countries, but is to be mastered as a vehicle to 
bring about “revolution in South Korea”. Evidently, the symbolic 
power of mastery of Hanja is still potent for some North Koreans. Yet, 
despite official support of Hanja learning, there appears to be a lack of 
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uniformity in Hanja education in the North. Most recent North Korean 
refugees, who are often from the lower classes, have never been ex-
posed to the script. Anecdotal evidence from North Korean defectors 
who have had Hanja education strongly suggests a rudimentary reten-
tion of Hanja. (Kuiwon 2014) 
Korean nationalism’s digraphic conflict is a lively topic in the 
South. In 2013, for the first time since Park Chung Hee’s Han’gŭl 
exclusivity program, all public elementary schools in Seoul were per-
mitted to teach Hanja causing contentious debate. (Cho 2013) The 
results of a 2014 Gallup poll on attitudes related to Hanja was reveal-
ing. Pollsters asked was whether Hanja was “Korean” or “foreign.” 
The results were as follows: 47 percent responded Hanja was “for-
eign”; 48 percent answered it was “Korean”; and 7 percent were unde-
cided or did not answer. This was statistically the same as the answers 
from a 2002 poll. (Han’guk sayong-e daehan insik chosa – 
2002/2014nyŏn pigyo) The results of the two polls underscores the 
relationship between script and identity and the continuing Korean 
digraphic conflict between Hanja and Han’gŭl. (Haarmann 1993: 144)  
A 2014 government study on the issue of Hanja instruction in 
South Korea recommended no expansion past the current 1,800 Hanja 
limit through high school. The document states: 
 
“The flood of nationalism, which had aimed to nurture the ‘people’ to be 
loyal through some limited language education, drove Chinese character in-
to being considered not only a vestige of Japanese imperialism, but also as 
an outdated, insignificant relic”. (W. J. Kim 2014: 7-9) 
 
The study recommends that the educational energies of students might 
be better spent “growing the right personality” and cultivating “rea-
sonable values”, which would, according to the study, better accom-
modate “curriculum to the modern demands of education”. (W. J. Kim 
2014: 7) The study’s conclusions may reflect an attempt by the Park 
Geun Hye administration to strike a medial position between a divided 
electorate. Curiously, the argument of focusing education on cardinal 
moral values seems a feint reflection of Chu Si-gyŏng’s arguments in 
the late nineteenth century; perhaps a testimony to the vitality of Ko-
rean nationalism’s conflicted embrace of the Hanja-Han’gŭl binary. 
A survey of the policies of both Koreas over half a century re-
lated to the use and instruction of Hanja and Han’gŭl (Chosŏn’gŭl) 
indicate that both scripts can serve the instrumental function of repre-
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senting the virtues and identity of the Korean nation, but not with 
graceful synchronicity. Korea’s digraphic conflict will likely continue 
to be intractable in the shadow of nationalism’s formation related to 
script. Expressing the views of the author of this article is a paraphras-
ing Chen Ming-Jer: this will not transcend paradox while lost from the 
Middle Way. (Chen 2002: 183-184)  
A daunting ritual in composing an article is deriving an ap-
propriate title. The intellectual trajectory of this “thought piece” 
seemed reasonably straightforward, at first. However, as the layers of 
the subject were unfolded, the initial title, though having topical suffi-
ciency, was wanting, perhaps in need of metaphor to capture some-
thing of the “soul of the article.” The author searched Korean lan-
guage poetry, both traditional and modern, looking for paradox. At 
last, contained in the below cited poem was something useful. 
 
八月十五夜 (팔월십오야) (추석날밤) 
The Night of the 15th Day of the Eighth Month (Ch’usŏk Night)  
李荇 (이행) (1478-1534) 
Yi Haeng (1478-1534) 
  
平生交舊盡凋零 (평생교구진조령)  
The friends that I have made in life are all dead; 
白髮相看影與形 (백발상간영여형)  
My shadow and form, with earlocks white, take each other in. 
正是高樓明月夜 (정시고루명월야)  
Atop a high loftbuilding, the moon is bright tonight, 
笛聲凄斷不堪聽 (적성처단불감청)  
And I cannot bear the cold sound of the flute. 
 
Yi Haeng, a civil official working in Kyŏngsang Province, 
wrote this poem on Ch’usŏk night in the year 1520. In the poem, the 
speaker’s melancholy is clearly pronounced. It has been speculated 
that Yi was considering lost “friends”, some of whom were victims of 
literary purges in 1504 and 1519. In the second line, the poet uses a 
common poetic expression “shadow and form” (yŏng yŏ hyŏng), also 
translated as “shadow and body”. The poet is lamenting those he has 
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lost, and that his only company are his own shadow and body, gazing 
at one another in the moonlight. Min Pyong-su’s analysis and Michael 
J. Miller’s translation (Min, 1999: 108-110) brought forth an explana-
tory metaphor, part of which was used for the title, along with Harald 
Haarmann’s use of the phrase “digraphic conflict”. (1993: 144) The 
speaker in the poem projects his internal landscape onto the world 
around him. It seems that more than through linear thinking, the inter-
sections between Korean nationalism and the Hanja-Han’gŭl binary 
are better expressed in the language of this poem; the poem renders in 
words the ethereal confluence of thought and identities that have trav-
elled on the arcing light of the dead, across memory, and across time. 
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